Maryland Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 4

Adoption in Maryland
John S. Strahorn Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John S. Strahorn Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L. Rev. 275 (1943)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol7/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 1

Maryland Law Review
VOLUME VII

JUNE,

1943

NUMBER 4

ADOPTION IN MARYLAND*
By

JOHN S.

STRAHORN, JR.**

Adoption by one person of another who is not his own
legitimate child, while early recognized in Roman law,
and long known in modern systems based thereon, is an
artificial, statutory creature in the Anglo-American system. It was not even provided for in England until 1926,'
although by now all American states have created it by
statute.2
This article is being written shortly after the fiftieth
anniversary of the first enactment of the Maryland adoption
statute, which occurred in 1892. 3 The statute has since
been thrice amended, for the first time in 19241 to provide
concurrent jurisdiction either where the petitioner or the
adoptee resides; then in 19355 to extend adoption jurisdiction to residents of Federal reservations within Mary* The sub-topics treated in this article, together with the pages at which
they begin, are set out at this point:
Introductory topics: Compliance with statute (page 277); Adoption of
adults (page 283).
The procedure for adoption: Territorial jurisdiction and recognition of
foreign decrees (page 286) ; Joint and several adoptions, capacity to adopt
(page 292) ; Notice and consent (page 294) ; "The best interests and welfare
of such child" (page 297) ; Revocation of adoption (page 301) ; and Change
of name, birth certificates (page 303).
The consequences of adoption: Custody, earnings and services (page
307) ; Support and maintenance (page 310) ; Inheritance (page 314) ; and
Revocation of will (page 320).
** Professor of Law, University of Maryland. Faculty Editor of the
REIEW.
16 and 17 Geo. V., c. 29.
24 VEaNIER, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1935) 279.
o Md. Laws 1892, Ch. 244, now Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Secs. 78-84.
The
various provisions of the adoption statute are each quoted once verbatim
herein in the following footnotes:
Section 78, n. 36; Section 79, n. 46;
Section 80, n. 55; Section 81, n. 111; Section 82, n. 80; Section 83, n. 122;
and Section 84, n. 49.
' Md. Laws 1924, Ch. 441, amending Section 78, infra, n. 36. The statute,
as originally enacted in 1892, provided only for jurisdiction where the
petitioner resides.
'Md. Laws 1935, Ch. 63, adding Section 79, infra, n. 46.
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land; and last in 19378 to provide for the adoption of adults.
All of the other provisions of the adoption law remain
as first enacted in 1892.
The need for and details of a legal system of adoption
would seem to depend on the motives which induce persons
to adopt others. These vary according to whether the
adoptee be an infant or an adult. In the more frequent
situation of adoption of an infant, the principal motive
would be to seek for a guarantee that all the legal attributes of the natural parent-child relation will follow from
the adoptive one. These would include the rights to custody of the child and to his earningsa and services during
minority; the duty to support the child along with, possibly, the expectation on the parent's part of receiving
support in his old age; and provision for inheritance by
the child from the parent in the event of intestacy.
All of these are involved when an infant is adopted,
and thus the desire is to give legal sanction to the factual
situation of a child's being reared in a family other than
that of his own natural parents. When an adult is to be
adopted, however, the adopter is not concerned with custody, earnings, services, and support of the child. Rather
the principal motive is to provide for inheritance.7
In general, with reference to the consequences, adoption
could well be analogized to the legitimation of an originally
illegitimate child, which latter, in Maryland law, can be
accomplished only by the combination of marriage to the
mother and recognition of paternity,8 although certain
other states permit it by mere recognition, with or without marriage.' In fact, there may be occasional motive,
under Maryland law, for one formally to adopt his own
illegitimate child for the purpose of indirectly accomplish"Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 172, amending Section 78, infra, n. 36.
"As indicating that the father's right of action for the child's earnings
is not outmoded, consider Lucas v. Maryland Drydock Co., 31 A. (2d) 637
(Md., 1943).
See infra, ns. 17 and 19, for mention of another possible motive.
0 Md. Code (1939) Art. 46, See. 6.
O See Holloway v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 A. 497
(1926), where the Maryland Court recognized a legitimation under the
law of the domicil (Nevada), which required only recognition by the
father.
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ing the sequelae of legitimation. One reason for this may
be in order to keep secret the fact of original illegitimate
relationship.10 Or, it may be because adoption is the only
way the consequences of legitimation can be accomplished,
as where the child's mother is dead, or the father is already married to another woman." In either event, he
is incapable of marrying the mother of the child, and thus
he cannot perform one of the two essential requirements
for legitimation, as such, in Maryland law.
While the sequelae of adoption and legitimation are
practically the same, they are not exactly so. They are
the same with respect to custody, earnings, services, and,
probably, support. But they are not exactly so with respect to inheritance, as will be shown later, for while probably a legitimated child would be treated as equal to an
originally legitimate one for all inheritance purposes, an
2
adopted one is not completely so regarded.
Compliance With Statute
As was mentioned above, in the Anglo-American system adoption is purely statutory. Thus, unless there be a
local statute in effect and it be complied with, the legal
sequelae of adoption do not follow from whatsoever arrangement the parties may have entered into looking toward an adoption in fact.
10The situation has been known to arise where a woman, separated from
her husband, gives birth to a child by another man, but the husband's
name is recorded on the birth certificate as father. If the wife should be
divorced from the first husband and later marry the father of her child,
adoption by them jointly would be the preferable route to "legitimate"
the child, for the reason that the presumption of legitimacy, difficult to
rebut, would be a barrier to establishing the necessary foundation fact
for normal legitimation, that the woman's child is that of the subsequently marrying husband. This was the obstacle in the well known
Maryland case of Scanlon v. Walshe, 81 Md. 118, 31 A. 498, 48 A. S. R. 488
(1895), a case involving inheritance.
11Where the father is already married to another woman, and wishes
to adopt severally, the consent of the wife must be obtained, or the spouses
must be living apart under circumstances entitling the husband to a divorce. or his wife must be insane. On this see the text, infra, circa n. 57.
11 Holloway v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., supra, n. 9, indicates that a
legitimated child Is counted as a "child" of the legitimating parent for all
purposes, including taking under the will of one of the parent's relatives.
This last is not so in the case of an adopted child, on which see the text
infra, circa n. 120.
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Whether or not a private arrangement or agreement,
entered into since the local statutory adoption procedure
has been in force, will be given enforcement as a contract
to adopt is a matter not yet passed on in Maryland adjudication. There is authority from elsewhere in favor of the
specific performance of such contracts, even after the death
of the prospective adopter. 13
Nothing will better illustrate the Maryland adherence
to the requirements of an extant adoption statute and
proper compliance therewith than a survey of several
Maryland cases dealing with adoption arrangements not
in compliance with the local statute, or entered into at a
time before its enactment in 1892.
An early dictum in Hiss v. McCabe, 4 decided before 1892,
stated that an "adopted" daughter was not a daughter who
could claim by inheritance. Then, too, in Fisher v. Wag5
ner,"
there had been no appeal from that part of the decree
which had held that an "adopted" son did not take, but the
Court by dictum said that this was proper inasmuch as
the adoption law of 1892 had been passed some years after
the death of the testator whose property was in litigation.
In Holritterv. Wagner 6 an "adopted" daughter had claimed
the right to administer, but had withdrawn the claim, and
on appeal the Court pointed out that the period of the
supposed adoption had long ante-dated 1892.
The case of Hillers v. Taylor 7 presents a rather amusing example of an attempted adoption by other than strict
statutory procedure. In that case plaintiff wife sued another woman for criminal conversation and for having
alienated the affections of plaintiff's husband. In defense,
defendant offered in evidence a document titled "Adoption
Paper", which was signed by the plaintiff's husband, and
also subscribed in writing by defendant and her husband,
whereby the plaintiff's husband purported to have adopted
the defendant. No objection was made to the'admission
S MADDEN, PERSONS
14 45 Md. 77 (1876).

AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

(1931)

366-367.

1 109 Md. 243, 246, 71 A. 999, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121 (1909).
16139 Md. 603, 116 A. 569 (1921).
17108 Md. 148, 69 A. 715 (1908).
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in evidence of this document, but the Court of Appeals,
affirmed the trial court's -action (although it reversed for
other reasons) in granting plaintiff's prayer that the evidence was insufficient to prove a legal adoption and that
the jury should not take into consideration any evidence
of said adoption as a defense in the case. The husband
had testified on cross-examination that the reason he had
the adoption papers drawn up was that he was going
around with the defendant and did not want people talking about them (the husband was then fifty-two years old
and the defendant thirty-five years old).
The Court pointed out that adoption was purely statutory in the Anglo-American system, and that the Maryland statute had not been complied with in this instance,
nor could it have been in view of the fact that the adoption
statute then only went to the adoption of infants, and the
alleged adoptee was an adult at the time.' This case and
the one following suggest that there may be an occasional
motive to adopt an adult in order to give an air of plausibility to a relation between persons of the opposite sex
which relation either is illicit in nature, or would otherwise appear to be so even though it is actually innocent.
Two cases have involved fraternal insurance benefits,
and in both of them the doctrine of estoppel was advanced
as a way to accomplish the substantial results of adoption
without statutory compliance. Estoppel was rejected in
one case, and applied in the other. In Supreme Council
of American Legion of Honor v. Green,9 the law governing
the society permitted the designation only of "relations"
or "dependents" as beneficiaries, and the certificate also
provided that it should be void for any false representations. The decedent had named as beneficiary "Elizabeth
A. Green, my niece." In fact, she was not his niece, nor
dependent upon him, but there had been an agreement
between them that they should act toward each other as
uncle and niece. The Court held against recovery by the
1 Consider also that, even where the adoption statute otherwise applies
and is complied with, there cannot be an adoption by a married person
severally without the consent of the other spouse or equivalent circumstances, on which see the text infra, circa n. 57.
1"71 Md. 263, 17 A. 1048, 17 A. S. R. 27 (1889).
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"niece" both because she was not within the class allowed
to be designated, and because of the falsity of the statement in the certificate. The Court rejected the contention
of estoppel against the society, which had been pleaded
because the local official who had witnessed the application
knew she was not really his niece.
In Clayton and Carves v. Supreme Conclave, Improved
Order of Heptasophs,° the facts were more complicated.
The plaintiffs, aged three and five at the time, were taken
to be reared by one Montgomery in 1881. In 1894 (two
years after the Maryland adoption statute had been passed,
so it happened) Montgomery took out a certificate of insurance in the defendant, naming the plaintiffs as beneficiaries and describing them therein as "adopted children".
He never legally adopted them. At that time the rules of
the society permitted the designation of children, without
specifying whether adopted children were included. Montgomery continued paying the fees on the certificate until
the time of his death. In 1913, prior to his death, the bylaws of the society were changed to allow payment of
benefits to adopted children only if legally adopted. These
children, as the Court pointed out, could not have been
legally adopted in 1913, as they were then adults and the
then extant law did not cover the adoption of adults. The
Court of Appeals decided in favor of the plaintiffs' right
to recover, through an estoppel against the society, which
had accepted the payments all along in knowledge that
the children were "adopted." But for the estoppel, the
member and his designated beneficiaries would have been
bound by the 1913 by-law change.
An occasional informal mode of adoption is by written
agreement between the "adopting" parents and the officials
of the foundling home from which the child is procured
for rearing. This problem was presented to our Court in
Zimmerman v. Thomas.2 1 In 1879, the Nursery and Child's
Hospital of Baltimore agreed in writing with one Thomas
that, as soon as an enabling act was passed, it would execute an indenture binding out and committing a certain
2- 130

Md. 31, 99 A. 949 (1917).
21152 Md. 263, 136 A. 636 (1927).
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child to Thomas and his wife "for adoption". Shortly
thereafter, the Legislature of 1880 enacted Chapter 64,
authorizing that hospital to bind out and control the destitute children under its care and, in pursuance thereof, the
hospital did execute the indenture earlier agreed upon.
The indenture provided that the child was placed with
the new parents for the purposes of adoption; and it included an agreement on their part to rear, maintain, and
educate her, and to adopt and treat her as if their own
legitimate offspring.
The question in the case was whether, as a result, the
child became the child of Thomas and wife for purposes
of inheritance, and the Court held that she did not. There
had not been any attempt at compliance with the act of
1892. The Court held that the enabling act and the indenture executed thereunder did not create a true adoptive
relationship. The 1892 law did include specific provision
for inheritance by an adopted child, and the Court adhered
to the view that only by compliance with it could that
follow. While the Court did not completely go into it,
yet they indicated what seemed already established under
the terms of the 1892 statute, that the child would not
have taken the estate in question even if she had properly
been adopted under the 1892 law.22
But the Court put the decision against the child
squarely on a rule that the legal consequences of adoption
do not follow from a binding out by an orphanage, even
under a statute authorizing that. The Court felt that the
relation created by the indenture was not as complete as
that contemplated by true statutory adoption, particularly
as there was reserved some control by the institution over
the child in the event that the new parents did not perform
their agreement sufficiently well.
A recent Maryland case, Spencer v. Franks, 28 enunciated clearly the strict statutory nature of adoption. The
trial court had decreed the adoption, but had qualified the
decree by adding to it: "With leave to parents to occasion2' Md.
Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 83, infra, n. 122; and see also text,
infra, circa n. 120 et 8eq.
23 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263 (1937).
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ally see the child." After the time for appeal from that
decree was passed, further litigation developed about the
custody of the child, and on appeal from that the Court
of Appeals held that the qualifying phrase was not properly inserted in the decree, that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the Chancellor, and that it was severable from
the rest, so that the void part could be stricken out, leaving
the adoption decree remaining; all this despite that the
adopting parents had not appealed from its inclusion in the
decree.4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out that
adoption is purely statutory, and the measure of the Chancellor's authority is the statute. 25 The statute confers jurisdiction merely to adopt, and to decree change of name
incidentally. The statute authorized no other decree. It
contemplated that custody should be an exclusive right
in the adopting parents, and a provision for partial custody
in the natural parents would defeat the statutory provisions
which extinguished rights in the natural parents by providing the natural parents "shall be freed of all legal
obligation towards" the child. The Court also pointed
out that there was implicit in the qualifying clause a continuance of the Chancellor's jurisdiction over the child,
whereas the intent of the Legislature was that the decree
of adoption should be final and binding, exhausting the
court's jurisdiction.
This recent decision further substantiates the point that
adoption is an artificial statutory creature, the details of
which are determined by the statute authorizing adoption,
and they are not to be extended by analogy to more flexible
procedures usually found in equity.
4 While it might be argued that the adopting parents should have been
bound by the inclusion of the clause in the decree, not having appealed
from it, yet it must be remembered that the adopted infant himself was
affected by its inclusion, and the failure of the adult parties to appeal
could not bind the infant as to a matter so vitally affecting his interests.
25 Contrast Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 600, 87 A. 1033 (1913),
where three of the seven judges sitting dissented on the ground that
there was no power in a divorce court to incorporate into a divorce decree
an agreement of the parties as to the wife's support which went beyond
what the court, of its own power, could have ordered. The ruling of the
majority in the Emerson case is, therefore, apparently different for divorce cases from the rule of Spencer v. Franks for adoption cases.
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Adoption of Adults
Prior to 1937 the general adoption statute permitted
the adoption only of minors by judicial procedure, 26 although occasional special laws 27 were passed by the Legislature each providing that a certain named adult person
should thereafter be the adopted child of another named
person. The 1937 Legislature amended 2s the general adoption law so as to make it cover both the adoption of adults
and of minors, and, because of this, Governor Nice vetoed
the special adoption acts passed at that session. 21 Several of the cases 30 discussed in the preceding section herein
concerning the need for statutory authorization of adoption happened to involve attempts by various methods to
accomplish the adoption of adults prior to the recent extension of the general adoption law to cover that situation.
The principal motive for formally adopting an adult
person would be, of course, to make certain that the
adoptee shall inherit the property of the adopting person
in the event of the latter's dying intestate either because
of a failure to execute a will, or from a finding of invalidity
of an attempted execution of one. There is absent the
other motive, more likely predominant when an infant
is adopted, of insuring the continued custody of the child
in the petitioner. When an adult is adopted, there results
no duty in the petitioner to support the adoptee, inasmuch
as the duty of a natural parent ceases with majority of
the child. Whether an adult adoptee could be prosecuted
under the criminal statute3 ' for non-support of the adopting
parent, if indigent or destitute, is part and parcel of the
21 See supra, ns. 17 and
17E. g., Md. Laws 1935,
28

20.
Ch. 417, 418.
Md. Laws 1937, Ch. 172, amending Section 78, infra, n. 36
21 Md. Laws 1937, page 1372.
20 In Hillers v. Taylor, supra, n. 17, the "adoptee" was an adult at the
time. In Clayton and Carves v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order of
Heptasophs, supra, n. 20, the adoptees were infants at the beginning of
their relation to the supposed adopting parent, but had become adults by
the time of the change of the society's by-law. In Supreme Council of
American Legion of Honor v. Green, supra, n. 19, it is probable that the
contractual "niece" was an adult at the time, although the point is not
clearly brought out.
"1Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Secs. 98-104.
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larger problem, discussed elsewhere, 2 of whether that statute applies to any adopted child.
There is as yet no judicial construction of the provision
for the adoption of adults. The amending statute provided
that all the provisions of the extant adoption statute should
apply in the case of the adoption of adults, except as otherwise provided. Under the specific provisions of the amending statute, the procedure for the adoption of adults differs
slightly from that for the adoption of minors, although the
legal sequelae of the decreeing of an adoption are the same.
When the prospective adoptee is an adult, the notice
required by the statute must be given to the next of kin
of the petitioner, rather than to the parents or guardians
of the adoptee, as is required in the case of an infant.
There is no mention in the statute of any legally operative
reasons that the next of kin can assert in opposition to an
adoption of an adult. No doubt the provision was inserted
to give them a chance to guard against the possibility of
surprise, fraud, undue influence, and mental incapacity.
The non-requirement of notice to the next of kin of
the adoptee is plausible in the light of the general rule
that natural parents and children continue to be the heirs
of each other even after the child has been adopted by
another.3 Possibly, an adult who had been adopted would
continue to be obligated to support his natural parents
4
under the criminal statute applicable to that problem.
The next of kin of the adult adoptee thus have nothing
to lose or gain by the decreeing or denying of such an
adoption. The requirement that the court shall investigate and find that the adoption will promote the best interests of the adoptee apparently" does not apply to the adoption of adults, as merely the consent of the adult to be
adopted is required.
Infra, circa n. 105, et seq.
8 See discussion, infra, circa n. 125, et 8eq.
8, Infra, circa n. 105, et 8eq.
81 Section 78, infra, n. 36.
32
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THE PROCEDURE FOR ADoTmON

Under the Maryland statute8 6 adoption is accomplished
by a judicial proceeding, based upon a petition filed by
the prospective adopting parent or parents, in an Equity
court, i.e., on the Equity side of the Circuit Courts in the
counties, and in either Circuit Court or Circuit Court No. 2
of Baltimore City, which latter two courts exercise the
Equity jurisdiction in Baltimore City exclusively. If the
court decides to grant adoption, a decree to that effect is
passed.
Customarily, an adoption case is docketed in the trial
court as an ex parte case in the name of the infant or
adult to be adopted. On the dockets in Baltimore City
a typical heading is "Ex parte in the Matter of the Adoption of ABC, an infant." When such cases are uncontested,
it is usual for the adoption to be decreed, and there is no
appeal. In contested cases, on appeal, the style of the
case is usually adversary in nature, with the name of the
appellant, be he petitioner for or opponent of the adoption,
first, and that of the other side as appellee."
The detailed points of the adoption procedure will be
discussed in turn under the ensuing sub-heads. Two cases,
in general, give some preliminary insight into adoption
procedure broadly, and they have been frequently discussed elsewhere in this article. One is Waller v. Ellis,"'
3 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 78: The several equity courts of this
State, upon the application of any person residing in the city or county
where such application is made, or the equity court in the city or county
where a person to be adopted resides, shall have power to pass a decree
declaring any person the adopted child of the petitioner, upon such reasonable notice to the parent or parents, guardian or guardians, of such
child, if any there be, where a child is to be adopted, or to the next of
kin of the petitioner where an adult is to be adopted, by summons, order
of publication or otherwise, as the court may order to be given, provided
that the court passing the decree shall become satisfied, upon careful investigation, in the case of a child, that the best Interests and welfare of
such child will be thereby promoted, and provided further, that the child,
if of sufficient intelligence and capacity to give an understanding assent,
or such adult, shall so desire.
Except as otherwise provided herein, the adoption of an adult shall be
governed by the laws applicable to adoption of a child, and an adopted
adult shall have the same rights as if adopted during minority.
87 No doubt, the appeal would be docketed as an ex parte proceeding
if the adoption were denied by the trial court, of Its own motion, without
any objection being filed by another party than the petitioner.
311169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
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which contained considerable detail about the filing of
testimony, the right of objectors to the adoption to be
heard, and the need for allowing the prospective adoptee
to be interrogated as a witness. Spencer v. Franks,9
analyzed at length elsewhere with reference to the need
for compliance with the statute, also contained an elaborate
treatment of the statutory nature of the procedure.
The ensuing sub-topics of the procedure problem which
now follow are, territorial jurisdiction and recognition of
foreign decrees; joint and several adoptions and capacity
to adopt; notice and consent; "the best interests and welfare of such child;" revocation of adoption; and change
of name and birth certificates. After those will then follow the third main heading herein, the consequences of
adoption.
TerritorialJurisdictionand Recognition of
Foreign Decrees
As in so many other topics of Domestic Relations law,
adoption involves some rather difficult problems of the
Conflict of Laws type. As is the case for divorce, the rule
of substantive law to be applied by a Maryland court in
granting or denying an adoption is the Maryland rule,
regardless of what contacts the facts of the case may have
with other states. The problems are, rather, those other
Conflict of Laws questions of territorial jurisdiction and
recognition of foreign decrees.
With respect to territorial jurisdiction, the statute"
explicitly provides that the case may be brought either
in the county where the petitioner resides, or (since 1924)
that where the prospective adoptee resides. Where both
are resident in Maryland, but in different counties, this
would provide concurrent jurisdiction (or venue) in those
two counties.
Where one of the two parties concerned lives in Maryland and one not, then the venue would be in the one
Maryland county where that one resides.
"173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263 (1937).
0 Section
78, supra, n. 36.
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There would seem to be no question about this latter
problem when the child to be adopted is the one resident
in Maryland, and the Court of Appeals so indicated in
Waller v. Ellis,4 1 although it denied the petition for adoption on the merits. The child was living in Maryland with
maternal grandparents, and the petitioner was an uncle
living in Delaware, who filed the petition in Maryland in
the county where the child lived. The Court stated that
there would have been jurisdiction to grant the adoption
had it been desirable on the merits.
The Court took the view that permitting adoption (in
a proper case) at the petition of a non-resident and against
a resident child would aid the benevolent purpose of adoption statutes, and it relied on the view of the Restatement
of Conflict of Laws, which states that: "The status of
adoption is created by either: (a) the law of the state
of domicil of the adopted child; or (b) the law of the
state of domicil of the adoptive parent if it has jurisdiction
over the person having legal custody of the child or if the
''4 2
child is a waif and subject to the jurisdiction of the state.
In the converse situation, more difficulty would seem
to be presented, although the statute, as it has read since
1892, would seem to authorize granting the adoption to
a resident petitioner with reference to a non-resident child.
The similar statute" for divorce jurisdiction is so applied.
If, however, the child or his custodian be not physically
present in Maryland, so that the Maryland courts have
no power to enforce the custody aspects of decreeing an
adoption of an infant child, then the problem of giving
immediate effect to the adoption decree rendered when
the petitioner only is resident becomes one of its recognition by the courts of other states. The statute contains
no such requirement as is indicated by the Restatement
in this situation, that Maryland shall have jurisdiction
over the custodian, or that the child shall be in Maryland
44
and a waif.
41

Supra, n. 38.

CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 142.
"3Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 38, as amended Md. Laws 1941, Ch.
516.
" RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934-) See. 142.
"RESTATEMENT,
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It might also be argued that the Maryland statute's
provision for concurrent jurisdiction either where petitioner or adoptee lives merely fixes the venue within
Maryland of an adoption case, granted that the case is
of a sort where Maryland has interstate jurisdiction to
decree the adoption. Waller v. Ellis would not be inconsistent with this suggestion, and there would still remain
a possibility that, as a matter of constitutional requirement, some such supplementary factor as the Restatement
requires would be necessary over and above mere residence of the petitioner.
Implicit in the whole question is the problem presented
by so many territorial jurisdictional rules, whether "residence" as a requirement means technical legal domicile
or merely physical presence for purposes of customary
daily activities. Particularly in the case of a minor, the
technical legal domicile may well be elsewhere even
though the child is physically present, because in Maryland custody. Legitimate children take the domiciles of
their fathers, and illegitimates those of their mothers, and
these change with changes of domiciles of the respective
parents until majority. A judicial answer to this problem
of non-residence of the child to be adopted may well go
off on determining the question whether "residence" means
full domicile or something else.
The potential enforceability of the decree in other states
would not seem to be relevant on the question whether
to grant it here to a resident petitioner against a nonresident child. This would follow by analogy to the divorce rule. Maryland grants divorces under circumstances
where, until recently, they were not necessarily entitled
to compulsory recognition in other states. 5 The statute
would seem to be clear to the effect that an adoption may
be decreed even though the child has neither physical
presence nor technical legal domicile in Maryland, so long
as the petitioner shall reside here.
15 Prior to Williams and Hendrix v. North Carolina, 63 S. Ct. 207
(U. S., 1942), and under the overruled case of Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562 (1906), other states did not have to give full faith and credit
to Maryland divorces based on domicil of plaintiff alone, and obtained
on mere newspaper advertisement.
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The discretionary power of the court to deny an adoption where it is not for the best interests of the child
might well lead to denial in contested cases where it is
indicated that there will be resistance to the enforcement
of the decree in other states. On the other hand, it might
be argued that it could be desirable to grant an adoption
at the residence of the petitioner, without any discernible
contacts between the child and the granting state, and
regardless whether other states would recognize it for
custody purposes, in order that a resident petitioner could
use the adoption device as a way of insuring inheritance
from him by the object of his wishes. The Restatement's
insistence on jurisdiction over the custodian, or the child's
being physically present as a waif, seems to proceed on
the idea that custody is the sole objective of an adoption,
and it overlooks the property aspect thereof. If the granting state has a valid reason for decreeing the adoption,
what difference should it make whether other states will
recognize it. This is particularly so with reference to
the adoption of adults.
The question of what is "residence" in Maryland has
also caused difficulty with reference to the omni-present
local problem of those persons who reside on Federal territory within the limits of Maryland. A 1935 amendment46
to the adoption statute provides that such persons shall
be regarded as residents of Maryland for purposes of proceedings for adoption. This statute was inspired by the
unfortunate Lowe case,4 7 which had ruled that they were
not such residents for divorce purposes, and which had
"Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 79: All persons residing on property
lying within the physical boundaries of any county of this State or
within the boundaries of the City of Baltimore but on property over
which jurisdiction is exercised by the Government of the United
States by virtue of the 17th Clause, 8th Section of the First Article
of the Constitution of the United States, and Sections 31 and 32 of
Article 96 of the Annotated Code of Public General Laws of Maryland,
shall be considered as residents of the State of Maryland and of the
County or of the City of Baltimore, as the case may be in which the
land is situate for the purpose of jurisdiction in the Courts of Equity
of this State in all applications for the adoption of infants.
"' Lowe v. Lowe, 150 Md. 592, 133 A. 729, 46 A. L. 1. 983 (1926). The
separate opinion of Bond, C. J., dissenting on the jurisdictional point,
pointed out that one of the unfortunate results of the rule of the
majority opinion would be to deprive such residents of access to Mary.
land courts for purposes of adoption, inter alia.
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resulted in an earlier statute" changing the rule for divorce purposes so as to allow such residence to suffice.
With reference to the converse problem of Maryland
recognition of adoptions decreed by the courts of other
states, specific provision in the statute gives the answer
partially and a judicial construction would seem to give
the rest. The statute4 9 provides that any "inhabitant" of
another State who was adopted in accordance with its
laws shall be entitled in Maryland to the same rights of
inheritance as would follow in the State where the adoption
was decreed, except as they may conflict with the provisions of the other parts of the Maryland statute.
On the surface, this would not seem inconsistent with
the view of the Restatement. In the first place, the Restatement" sets up standards, outlined above which are
similar to each other, for both the power to grant an adoption in the first place, and for its being entitled to recognition in other states if once granted. The further pronouncement is made5 ' that other states will give the same
effect to an adoption as the state decreeing it. Specifically
concerning inheritance of realty is it provided 52 that the
law of the state where the land lies determines whether
the adopted child is an heir and the extent to which he
inherits.
But a triple criticism could be made of the Maryland
statutory section. In the first place, the word "inhabitants" merely further complicates the area of the dispute
about whether "domicil" and "residence" are synonymous
when used as operative words for purposes of territorial
jurisdiction. Then, too, the statute only purports to answer questions of recognition of foreign adoptions for certain, not all purposes of the consequences of adoption, viz.,
4

Md. Code

41Md.

(1939)

Art. 16, Sec. 39.

Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 84: Any inhabitant of
State adopted as a child in accordance with the laws thereof
proof of such fact be entitled in this State to the same rights
ance and distribution as he or she would have enjoyed in
where adopted except in so far as they may conflict with the
of the five preceding sections.
50 RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 142.
rIbid, Sec. 143.
52 Ibid, Sec. 247.
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the inheritance of property. There is no mention of custody, earnings, services, or support. Finally, even for the
limited purposes, the statute does not purport to recognize
all foreign adoptions, but only those decreed in states
where the jurisdictional residence was that of the adoptee.
As the statute reads, an adoption decree granted by another state to a resident petitioner and against a non-resident adoptee would not entitle the latter to inherit Mary53
land property.
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether either for
inheritance or for all purposes, we will recognize adoption
decrees granted under circumstances where we ourselves
are authorized by our statute to grant them, viz., against
a non-resident child and in favor of a resident petitioner.
If we adhere to the view of the Restatement that the
granting state must either be the domicile of the adoptee,
or have jurisdiction over him through his custodian or as
a waif, we may refuse to recognize decrees we ourselves
would grant, unless, further, future judicial decision writes
the Restatement limitations into our concurrent jurisdiction statute for purposes of our own granting of adoptions.
With reference to the difference between recognition
for inheritance purposes and recognition for other purposes, it would seem that the Court of Appeals has already
answered that question, and has supplied the defect of
54
the statutory section, in Victory Sparkler Co. v. Gilbert.
In that case the child had been adopted by the adopting
parents in Delaware, where all then lived, by a proper proceeding under Delaware law. The mother and child moved
to Maryland, where the child was killed in an industrial
accident, and the adopting mother claimed compensation
as a "mother" under the local Workmen's Compensation
law. The Court held her to be entitled as a mother and
thus not only interpreted the Compensation law to extend
to adoptive relationships, but also gave effect to an adoption decree of another State in a situation not covered
by the statutory provision mentioned above.
51 See infra, circa n. 133, for other mention of the awkwardly phrased
nature of this section.
5160 Md. 181, 153 A. 275 (1931).
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Joint and several adoption; capacity to adopt
Typically, of course, a petition to adopt is filed by a
husband and wife jointly, because the most frequent situation involves an infant's being reared in a family other
than his own. The Maryland statute not only provides
for this,'" but it also recognizes that petitions may be filed
by an individual severally, be he or she married, widowed,
divorced, or single. In fact, as the statute reads, several
adoption would seem to be the contemplated rule, and
joint adoption by husband and wife" the exception, as
special provision for the latter is made in a section following the first and general one, which itself speaks in
terms of the "petitioner."
It would probably be a safe assumption that two persons
not husband and wife to each other would not be permitted to adopt jointly, in view of the basic use in the
statute of the term "petitioner", and the specific provisions
for spouses. But, granting this to be so, in the case of
several adoption there are no limitations on who may
adopt. The Maryland statute contains no such rule as
is found in the statutes of some other states, requiring
the adopter to be older than the adoptee by a stated number
of years. In fact, as our statute reads, one might adopt
a person older than himself, even one of his own direct
ancestors.
While the statute has no specific requirement that the
adopter shall be an adult, yet this would inevitably seem
to follow from the general rule that an infant is not sui
juris. To be sure, the law permits some infants to marry
and produce children by natural processes. Even then,
it would be difficult to visualize a judicial interpretation
of the statute which would permit an infant to adopt
"SMd. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 80: The husband and wife may file
a petition jointly praying the court to decree the adoption by them
jointly of any child, but no decree of adoption shall pass where the
petitioner is a married person unless it be shown that the husband or
wife of the petitioner consents to the adoption, or is hopelessly insane,
or that the parties are living apart under such circumstances as would
entitle the petitioner to a divorce.
58 A dictum in Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R.
263 (1937) points out that when a child is adopted by husband and wife
jointly it becomes the child of both adopting parents.
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through "next friend", or even if emancipated, whatever
that means.
One limitation is imposed on several adoption other
than by husband and wife jointly. If the sole petitioner is
then a married person, the adoption may not be decreed
unless the other spouse consents, or is hopelessly insane,
or the parties are living apart under such circumstances
as would entitle the petitioner to a divorce.5 7 The statute
does not specify what kind of divorce is meant, whether
a vinculo, a mensa, or both. There would seem no question
that, if the grounds be for an a vinculo one, the consent
is dispensed with, but it is not so clear that it is also dispensed with merely for the commission of a mensa grounds
alone. To be sure, if the a mensa ground be desertion, it
will become an a vinculo one within eighteen months, so
that there is a real problem only for cruelty and vicious
conduct. For that matter, frequently when the innocent
spouse has separated because of one of these, constructive
desertion occurs anyhow, and after eighteen months will
entitle to an a vinculo divorce.
This requirement of consent or equivalent circumstances when a married person wishes to adopt severally
would provide an obstacle in the situation outlined
earlier," wherein a person might wish by adoption indirectly to accomplish the effect of legitimation of his own
illegitimate child under circumstances where it could not
be done directly by legitimation. For, if the obstacle to
legitimation is that the father is married to another woman,
and thus cannot marry the mother of the child even if
she be still alive, the other spouse's consent or equivalent
circumstances must occur before the indirect legitimation
by adoption may be brought about.
Occasionally adoption is used in the case of step-children, i.e., where one of the natural parents is dead or
divorced and the other, having custody of the child, has
married again. While at first glance it would seem a
matter of indifference whether the petition be filed jointly
5 Section 80, supra, n. 55.
8 Supra, n. 11.
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by the natural and the step-parent, or by the step-parent
alone with consent of spouse, yet it must be remembered
that if an adoption be decreed on the several petition of
the step-parent, it might have the effect of depriving the
natural parent of his or her presumptive claims in the
event of a separation of the spouses. Thus it is that it is
better that the petition in such a case be filed jointly
by the spouses, who are the natural and step-parents, respectively. One occasionally sees instances of adoptions
of grand-children by grand-parents, or of nieces and
nephews by uncles and aunts, and the statute allows these
by its implications5 9
Notice and Consent
Twin questions naturally arising in the adoption field
are those of the necessity of giving notice to and obtaining
the consent of the persons affected by an adoption, viz.,
the adoptee, and the next of kin of both the adoptee and
the adopter. The Maryland statute" provides for notice
to the parent or parents, guardian or guardians, of an
infant child to be adopted; or, if the prospective adoptee
be an adult, then for notice to the next of kin of the petitioner, not of the adoptee. The trial court is given discretion as to how the notice shall be transmitted, and
may order it to be given by "summons, order of publication,
or otherwise." Of course, where those persons entitled
to notice enter into a written consent in advance of the
adoption, the filing of the consent in the papers of the
case is usually taken as dispensing with notice to them
in other fashion, as well it may.
An interesting problem arises with reference to who
is entitled to notice when an illegitimate child is sought
to be adopted.'
There is no Maryland adjudication on
"Quaere,
may one adopt his or her husband or wife? The motive
for doing this would be (if there were no other children) to make certain that the adoptee would inherit all, not merely a fractional part, of
the adopter's property in the event of death intestate.
60 Section 78, supra, n. 36.
1 Consider also, with reference to the adoption of children shortly
after birth, the Maryland statute, Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Secs. 622 to
626, which forbids, save in enumerated exceptional situations, the separation of a child under the age of six months from its mother for the
purpose of placing it in a foster home or institution.
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the point, but for lack of specific treatment of it in the
statute, it may well be assumed that the mother of an
illegitimate is entitled to the notice, but the father is not.
On the other hand, in the case of legitimate children, where
the parents have been separated or divorced and the custody has been awarded to one or the other, or even to
neither, both would seem entitled to notice nevertheless,
in view of the fact that decreeing an adoption involves
more than custody, and there is general authority to that
effect.
There is no stated requirement of notice to the prospective adoptee, but that is bound up in the requirement
of consent of the adoptee in those instances where he or
she is an adult or is of sufficient age to comprehend. Thus
implicitly notice and more is dictated in those situations
where notice could be important.
While the statutes of some states make mandatory the
consent of the natural parents where an infant is to be
adopted, that is not so in Maryland, and, as just mentioned,
the only reference to consent is in the requirement that
an adult shall consent to be adopted, and that the infant
shall also consent if "of sufficient intelligence and capacity
to give an understanding assent." Then, too, there is the
requirement, discussed elsewhere, 62 that the spouse of a
married petitioner shall consent to a several adoption, in
the absence of certain equivalent circumstances allowing
a several adoption without such consent.
While our statute does not make mandatory the consent
of the natural parents to the adoption of an infant, and
mere notice to them is sufficient, yet the Court of Appeals
has indicated that it will not permit trial courts to decree
adoptions over the expressed objection of the natural parent or parents, save in very strong cases. In Connelly
v. Jones6e it thus refused the adoption, although it was
obvious that the custody of the child would continue in the
64
unsuccessful petitioners. But in Alston v. Thomas it
did decree the adoption over the protest of the sole sur02 Rupra, n.
57.
6' 165 Md. 544, 170 A. 174 (1933).
64 161 Md. 617, 158 A. 24 (1931).
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viving natural parent, having found that he had abandoned
the child. These cases are discussed more at length in
the section following herein, with reference to the problem of the merits of adoption cases.
In Waller v. Ellis,65 also discussed in the ensuing section,
the Court denied the adoption sought by an uncle (the
parents being dead) against the wishes of the grand-parents, who had custody of the child. The adoption was
denied, however, on the merits of the case, as not being
for the best interests and welfare of the child, rather than
for mere lack of consent or noting of opposition by the
grand-parents, the custodians, and the other formal guardians of the child. The Court pointed out that the consent
of custodians or guardians, even of natural parents, was
not essential to adoption jurisdiction.
Waller v. Ellis66 also threw some further light on the
statutory requirement of consent (called "assent" and
"desire") by an adult adoptee or by an infant one if of
sufficient "intelligence and capacity." In the trial court
the respondents had offered the child, the prospective
adoptee, as a witness, and the court refused the offer. This
was held error, for in no other way could the court find
out whether the child was of sufficient intelligence and
capacity other than by examining her at the request of
the side offering her as a witness. In this case the child
was nine years old at the time the petition was filed.
Where the natural parents, or guardians if the parents
be dead, actually consent to the adoption, the case usually
becomes routine, as this serves to dispense with notice,
and, whether properly or not, it is usually taken as indicating that the adoption is for the best interests of the child.
A problem that arises in connection with the granting
of consent by natural parents to an adoption is whether
they can confer such consent upon condition of being allowed occasional contact with or custody of the child, or
the privilege of retaking custody in the event that the
adopting parents die or become divorced. This was an6

46

169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
1bid, 169 Md. 26,
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swered in the negative in Spencer v. Franks,67 where the
Chancellor, in decreeing an adoption, had added to the
decree a clause entitling the natural parents to see the
child occasionally. In subsequent litigation this clause was
held beyond the power of the Chancellor to insert, and
void, but, being separable, the remainder of the adoption
decree stood despite the void provision.
From this the lesson remains, that if natural parents
do consent to an adoption, they must be ready to surrender
all claims to the child, because our adoption law does
not recognize the concept of a quasi or incomplete adoption.
The same lesson is brought out by Backus v. Reynolds,8
discussed elsewhere on the point of revocation of adoption,
to the effect that if an adoption is once validly decreed,
particularly when with consent of natural parents, a subsequent change of mind by the natural parents will avail
not.
Somewhat the same thing is brought out in converse
fashion in Zimmerman v. Thomas,"9 where the Court found
that the "binding out" by an orphanage prior to 1892 did
not create a complete adoption, and part of its reasoning
was about a provision in the indenture which had reserved
to the orphanage the right to reclaim the child if the foster
parents' custody proved improper. This reservation of
control, the Court thought, was inconsistent with the true
adoptive relationship later made possible by the still extant
act of 1892.
"The Best Interests and Welfare of Such Child"
The substantive law governing the question whether
the Chancellor should decree an adoption at petitioner's
request is delusively simple, on paper. If the prospective
adoptee is an adult, it may be decreed simply upon his
consent. If the prospective adoptee is an infant, consent
is required if he be sufficiently mature to comprehend, and,
regardless of such maturity, the Chancellor shall decree
the adoption of an infant only if he shall find "that the
47 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263 (1937).
e8 159 Md. 601, 152 A. 109 (1930).
" 152 Md. 263, 136 A. 636 (1927).
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best interests and welfare of such child will be thereby
promoted."7
This "best interests" principle is the same
as the one that is supposed to guide the adjudication of
71
custody litigation.
Thus the test is entirely subjective, depending on the
facts of the particular case, as it should be. It would
be fruitless to attempt to generalize about when and when
not the best interests of a child would be served by an
adoption. Many adoption cases are routine, where all concerned are in agreement that decreeing the adoption is
for the best interests of the child. In this connection, however, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City has recently
adopted a new Equity Rule 36,72 the effect of which is
to require an investigation of the desirability of decreeing
an infant's adoption by a probation or other court officer,
save where the Chancellor is already possessed of sufficient
information to enable him to determine the question without the aid of an investigation. The Chancellor is required
thereunder to consider such report, together with such
other evidence and exhibits as may be offered, before the
passage of any final decree of adoption.
Few cases are contested, however, and few of these
get to the Court of Appeals. It is proposed to discuss those
few which have gone there on the merits of the question
whether to decree the adoption, so that some insight into
judicial attitudes as to when an adoption will be for the
best interests of the adoptee may be obtained, even if
generalizations are impossible.
In Alston v. Thomas78 the petitioners, husband and wife,
filed a petition against the natural father seeking to adopt
the child. The mother of the child had died in a public
hospital, and, after the child's birth and the mother's death,
the father had advised a nurse at the hospital that he could
not receive the child into his home, as it was already overSection 78, supra, n. 36.
See Md. Code (1939) Art. 42, Sec. 21, to the effect that "the determination of the [habeas corpus] case shall be guided and controlled by
a parental consideration of what is demanded by the best interest of
such minor."
72 Baltimore Daily Record, December 7, 1942.
70
71

73

161 Md. 617, 158 A. 24

(1931).
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crowded, and he orally assented to the child's being placed
elsewhere. The hospital placed it in the custody of petitioners, who became attached to it and sought the adoption.
The Court found that the father had abandoned the child,
and it had become a public charge; and he was even unable
to support his other children without charitable assistance;
and that the home of the foster parents was a suitable place
for the child's welfare; and it reversed the lower court and
ordered the decreeing of an adoption.
In Connelly v. Jones74 the Court reversed the trial
court's action in decreeing the adoption, although from
the facts of the case it was obvious that the petitioners
would still continue in custody of the child, which itself
was not what the natural father, the surviving parent, was
opposing as, apparently, he was opposed merely to the
formal adoption. When the child was three the mother,
becoming ill, placed the child with her own aunt, now petitioner in adoption, and there the child remained, in Queen
Anne's County. The mother was hospitalized and died.
The father lived in Baltimore City where he worked until
the economic depression of 1932 caused him to become
unemployed, and he and another child were then subject
to charitable assistance. The father made occasional trips
to the Eastern Shore to see the child, but he could not
afford this often, nor was he able to contribute more than
a nominal sum toward the child's maintenance.
The testimony all showed, and the father himself conceded, that the great-aunt's home was a desirable place for
the child to be. The Court said that, had the question before it been merely one of custody, the great-aunt would
have been awarded it, as the father was unable to maintain
it. But the Court was reluctant to take the extreme step
of decreeing the adoption, which would deprive the father
of his relationship to the child. The Court stated that the
meaning of the statute was that natural parents should be
deprived of their relationships against their wills only
under extraordinary conditions which did not exist in the
case.
7'165

Md. 544, 170 A. 174

(1933).
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In Waller v. Ellis7 5 the Court of Appeals reversed a
decree of adoption and dismissed the petition. The natural
parents were dead. The child, aged nine, was living in
Maryland with her maternal grand-parents who, along
with the guardians, opposed the petition. The petitioner,
aged 58, was the child's uncle, who lived with an unmarried sister, aged 60, and a feeble-minded brother, aged 61.
There were allegations in opposition to the petition which
suggested that the petitioner had an ulterior economic
motive in seeking the adoption, and that he had customarily
cruelly mis-treated members of his household, and had
allowed his brother, the child's father to become despondent, and insane, without providing medical treatment, all
of which allegedly had led up to the brother's suicide.
The testimony for the petitioner was never properly
incorporated into the record of the case, and, therefore,
the Court ignored it. Witnesses also testified for the respondents, and their testimony was properly before the
Court, and the Court found it to show that decreeing an
adoption was improper. The grand-parents were found
to be respectable, substantial, and highly regarded citizens
of the county, whose manner of rearing their own children
had merited the approval of the neighbors, and they had
similarly cared for the grand-daughter; they wished to
keep the child; she wished to remain. There was some
testimony as to "trouble" between the petitioner's family
and the people in his community. On all these facts, the
Court found that the best interests and welfare of the
child would be served by keeping her with the grandparents and by denying the uncle's petition to adopt, which
would have carried with it the probability of being in his
custody in circumstances far less conducive to her welfare.
Some insight into the Court's attitude toward the problem of the merits of the case is also afforded by Backus v.
Reynolds, 6 where the Court dismissed a bill brought by
the natural parents to rescind and set aside an adoption
earlier decreed. The Court found no proof of fraud, mis75 169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
76159 Md. 601, 152 A. 109 (1930).
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take, duress, surprise, or defect in the adoption proceedings, and remarked that the allegations of the original
petition for adoption had set forth facts giving the original
court jurisdiction to pass the decree.
The petition had set out the consent of the natural
parents; that the petitioners possessed ample means to
provide for the proper support and maintenance of the
infant to insure her future welfare and happiness; that
the petitioners had had the custody of the child and had
become greatly attached to it; and that the natural parents
had been divorced; and that the natural mother had placed
the child with the petitioners. It can well be taken from
these facts that, other things equal, they suggest that the
best interests of the child did demand the decreeing of
an adoption.
Revocation of adoption
The title of this sub-topic is somewhat of a misnomer,
for there is no provision in the Maryland statute for the
revocation, in the strict sense, of a validly decreed adoption. That is, there is neither provision for such revocation
in a contested case, against the will of the adopting parents;
nor, for that matter, even for revocation with the mutual
consent of the adopting parents and the natural next of
kin who either had consented, or were at least notified,
when the original adoption was decreed.
In the former case, the most that could be done by those
seeking completely or partially to revoke the adoption
against the wishes of the adopting parents would be to
institute either a new adoption proceeding or a custody
one in their own names. But such proceedings would have
no more chance of success than they would have against
natural parents who oppose adoption or deprivation of
custody.
In the latter case, where both the adopting parents and
the natural next of kin are in agreement on terminating
the adoption, it would seem that the only proper procedure
would be to have the natural relatives adopt the child as
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their own, by new proceedings, with the consent of the
first adoptive parents, and upon the Court's finding that
such new adoption is for the child's best interests.
Rather, the only steps which can be taken by the natural
relatives or other interested parties in order directly to
upset a once decreed adoption would be under general
procedures for attacking a decree for improprieties in its
7
obtention. 76 a This was brought out in Backus v. Reynolds,
the principal Maryland case on the topic.
In that case the child had been born to the natural
mother after the father, her husband, had deserted her;
and the parents were later divorced. The mother was
unable to support the child and it was placed with foster
parents who later wished to adopt it. The natural mother,
after having the legal effect of the adoption explained to
her, consented to it, as did the natural father. The petition
for adoption set out facts indicating it to be for the best
interests of the child that it be adopted; and an adoption
was duly decreed.
A few months after the adoption the natural mother
married her second husband, and shortly thereafter
brought this proceeding by independent bill (the adoption
decree having become enrolled) to have the decree of
adoption annulled on alleged grounds of mistake, fraud,
duress, and a noncompliance with the statute. The Court
of Appeals pointed out that an adoption decree could be
annulled after enrollment only for some one of those reasons (including surprise), but it found none of them to
be present and so affirmed the dismissal of the bill of
78
complaint.
Thus it is that a subsequent change of mind by the
natural parents after having once consented to the adoption
7 See Dunnigan v. Dunnigan, 31 A. (2d) 634 (Md., 1943), where a
decree of adoption in favor of grand-parents was stricken out on the petition of the child's father, on the ground that he was not a non-resident,
where the proceedings had been on the basis of his non-residence. The
petitioners in adoption had consented to the striking out, and the case on
appeal did not involve the adoption point.
77159 Md. 601, 152 A. 109 (1930).
78 In Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263
(1937), the natural parents had also made allegations of recently discovered fraud in their effort to undo the adoption, but the Court found
the proof trivial and Insuffielent.
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will avail not after an otherwise valid adoption decree has
become enrolled. But this would seem to follow from the
local rule that consent of the natural parents is not absolutely necessary to an adoption (although notice must be
given), as the court may decree an adoption against their
wishes in a strong enough case. When the natural parents
do specifically consent, this shows both sufficient notice
to them, and probably that the adoption is probably for
the best interests of the child.
Adoption is meant to be permanent, and it is probably
salutary that our statute contains no mention of revocation
in the true sense. In fact, in Spencer v. Franks," the Court
pointed out that the intention of the statute was that the
decree of adoption should be final and binding, not subject
to the continuing jurisdiction of the court. With the entry
of the final decree, the Chancellor, for most purposes, exhausts the jurisdiction of the court.
It is here suggested, therefore, that even if a Chancellor
should, upon the request of and with the mutual consent
of all the parties concerned in the original proceeding,
reopen the decree and rescind it, this act would, no doubt,
be void as beyond his jurisdiction, akin to the act of the
original Chancellor in Spencer v. Franks in appending- a
qualifying phrase to the decree purporting to entitle the
natural parents to occasional contact with the child.
Change of name; Birth Certificates
The statute specifically provides"° that the court decreeing an adoption may provide in the decree for the
change of name of the adopted child, if the petition contains a prayer to that effect. Thus it is made unnecessary
to pursue the separate and more complicated equitable
procedure"' for change of name in cases other than adoption, with its usual requirement of newspaper advertisement as notice to all concerned.
79 upra, n. 78.
11 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 82: If the petition contains a prayer
to that effect, the court may also decree that the name of the child be
changed.
'Md.
Code (1939) Art, 16, Sec. 118.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. V11

A recent statute 2 makes provision for the substitution,
in the event of an adoption, of a new birth certificate in
the files of the proper Vital Statistics officials, the State
Department of Health for births in the counties, and the
Baltimore City Health Department for City births. This
procedure apparently would apply whether a change of
name is decreed, or where, because the last name of the
adoptee was already the same as that of the adopter, no
judicial order for such change was necessary.
Under its terms, whenever a child has been adopted (as
also when an illegitimate has been legitimated, or its
paternity established), the Registrar of Vital Statistics, on
request, removes from his files the child's original birth
certificate, and substitutes therein a new birth certificate
identical in contents with the original, except that the
names of the adopting parents are filled in the blanks
calling for parents' names, instead of the names of the
natural parents; and, if the decree changed the child's
name, the new name is entered as the child's name. There
is no mention of the fact of adoption. The original birth
certificate in the names of the natural parents is then sealed
up, the seal not to be broken save by court order or by
order of the Registrar for adequate reason.
When certified copies of the child's birth certificate are
called for, they are then made of the new or substituted
certificate, and the fact of adoption is thus protected from
unnecessary disclosure. Of course, if it should be absolutely necessary to prove original parentage then, by court
order, the seal may be broken and the original one copied
and certified. For normal purposes, of course, a certified
copy of the substituted one will suffice. For that matter,
much use of birth certificate information is made without
even having a completely certified copy, because the Registrars also issue both engraved certificates stating that a
birth certificate has been filed in certain names, and informal cards merely stating the basic facts, which latter
are used for public school enrollment. These latter two
82Md.

Code

(1939)

Art. 43, See. 22.
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are identical in form for substituted certificates with those
used in the case of natural birth.
The provision for this substitution of birth certificates
in the case of adoption is a most salutary one. It not only
enables the adopting parents who wish to do so to conceal
the fact of adoption from a child adopted while still a baby,
but, far better, it enables both the parents and the child,
even where the child is told of his adoptive status, to avoid
embarrassment from having unnecessarily to disclose the
fact of adoption to third persons. As birth certificates are
becoming more and more necessary in modern life, it is
well that provision has been made for this substitution
of them in the case of adoption. Counsel for petitioners
in adoption may well call the clients' attention to this
statute. s"
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ADOPTION

Granting a valid adoption to have been decreed, there
now remains the final main heading, what legal consequences follow therefrom. In general, the same sequelae
follow as if the adoptee had been born the legitimate child
of the adopter. But there are minor differences that need
to be set out, discussed, and speculated about, and these
3a
will follow.s
One problem of the consequences of adoption has been
the subject of neither statutory nor case-law treatment,
and so only brief speculation about it here will be given,
without making it a separate sub-head. That is the matter
of whether inter-marriage is lawful between persons in
adoptive relationships where it would not be lawful in
similar natural relationships. Put specifically, may there
be marriage between adopting parent and adopted child,
or between adoptive brothers and sisters, merely to mention the two closest forbidden relationships? Neither the
81 The State Bureau of Vital Statistics has had prepared printed
forms distributed to the county Clerks' offices, to be given to counsel for
petitioners In adoption, for use in applying for the substitution of a
birth certificate after adoption.
8, Concerning the position of adopted children under the naturalization
laws, see U. S. C., Title 8, Sections 502(h), 716.

306

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

marriage statute84 nor the adoption law affords the answer,
and apparently the question has not yet arisen in the
Court of Appeals.
The Maryland marriage law does forbid intermarriage
between a person and his or her step-parents or parentsin-law, these being the affinity relationships analogous to
the forbidden intermarriage of parent and child. By further analogy, in view of the fact that adoptive parentage
is even more intimate than affinity parentage of the stepor in-law sort, the former should be forbidden.
On the other hand, the marriage law does not forbid
intermarriage between brother-in-law and sister-in-law,
nor between step-brother and step-sister. By analogy to
that permission, it might be argued that marriage between
adoptive brother and adoptive sister ought also to be permitted. An interesting question also arises whether, if
adoptive relatives wish to intermarry, it would be a criminal offense for them to conceal the fact of adoptive rela85
tionship in applying for the license.

It may be that the first judicial answer to the question
whether the prohibited degrees include adoptive relationships will be given through such a criminal prosecution,
or in a mandamus case to compel the issuance of the license
where the relationship by adoption is disclosed. More than
likely, if the marriage is actually performed, and no direct
annulment suit is brought, and the question arises after
the death of one of the parties, the courts will hold that
the impediment, if any, makes the marriage only voidable
by proceeding, and so will avoid the question whether the
marriage should have been performed in the first place. 86
Perhaps a distinction may yet be made between adoptions
during infancy and adoptions of adults, on the theory that
more intimate relationships arise from the former, making
permission to marry less desirable. Conversely, the quesMd. Code (1939) Art. 62, Sec. 2.
"AMd. Code (1939) Art. 62, See. 5, as amended Md. Laws 1941, Ch.
529.
86As in Harrison v. State, use of Harrison, 22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658
(1864) where the marriage of uncle and niece was held merely voidable
by proceeding, not void ab initio.
84
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tion is, may one adopt his own spouse? 7 Nothing in the
statute bears on this, either.
The sub-topics which follow are, the rights to the custody, earnings, and services of the adoptee; the respective
duties of adopted child and adopter to support the other;
inheritance by and from the adopted child; and the effect
of adoption of a child as a revocation of the adopter's will.
Custody, Earnings, and Services.
Perhaps the most important of the consequences of
the adoption of an infant is that the adopting parent acquires exactly the same right to the custody, earnings,
and services of the adoptee as he would have, during
minority, in the case of his own legitimate child. But,
oddly enough, nothing in the Maryland adoption statute
so provides. The statute was apparently drafted entirely
in terms of the rights of the adoptee, for the nearest thing
in it to the present topic is the provision that the adoption
shall entitle the adopted child to the same rights of protection, education, and maintenance as if born to the petitioner in lawful wedlock. It is also provided that the
natural parents shall be freed from all legal obligation
toward the child.
While the statute is silent about the adopter's right to
custody, yet the Court of Appeals has supplied the oversight by interpretation and, proceeding from the provisions
stated above in favor of the adoptee, it has spelled out the
adopter's rights to custody. No doubt, the incidentals
thereto follow along.
This was principally arrived at in Spencer v. Franks.8
There, at the time of the original adoption decree, the Chancellor had appended thereto a qualifying clause entitling
the natural parents occasionally to see the child. At this,
a later stage, the adopting parents successfully sought to
have the clause stricken out, and the natural parents unsuccessfully attempted a three-fold attack, first, by seeking to have the clause kept in and enforced; second, by
11

See supra, n. 59.
88 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263 (1937).
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attempting to nullify the entire adoption decree for fraud
in its obtention; 9 and, third, by bringing an independent
custody proceeding on the basis that the custody in the
adopting parents was not for the best interests of the child.
The Court found the qualifying clause beyond the jurisdiction of the Chancellor in the adoption case, and that
it was severable, so that the decree would stand; that there
was no proof of fraud in the obtention and that there was
no showing that a continuance of custody in the adoptive
parents was detrimental to the child. Thus, the natural
parents were completely deprived of any claim to custody
of the child.
From this it can be taken that the effect of adoption
is to take away from the natural parents and to confer
on the adopting ones that presumptive claim to unhampered custody of the child which usually results from
legitimate birth in favor of the natural parents. As a
result, an adoptive parent can be deprived of complete
custody only under those circumstances which would lead
to deprivation of a natural parent when there was no
adoption in the picture.
The Court found that exclusive custody in the adoptive
parents was a natural corollary of the infant's being entitled to protection, education, and maintenance from them,
and of the natural parent's obligations being terminated.
The Court also said that the statute clearly contemplated
that the adoptive infant should not be subject to the conflicting authority of natural and adoptive parents. 0 The
Court cited Waller v. Ellis,91 where a somewhat similar
conclusion was announced, more or less by way of dictum.
There, in the course of denying a petition for adoption of
a child then in the custody of its grandparents, who op" The Court's finding that the qualifying clause was severable from the
main adoption decree overruled any possible contention that the whole
decree was void because it contained a part in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
90 See Zimmerman v. Thomas, 152 Md. 263, 136 A. 636 (1927), discussed
in the text 8upra, circa n. 21, et 8eq., on the point that true adoption did
not result from the indenture In that case because, among other reasons,
the hospital had reserved some oversight of the relations between the
child and the "adopting" parents.
91 169 Md. 15, 179 A. 289 (1935).
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posed the adoption, the Court had pointed out that to
grant the uncle's petition would be to entitle him to the
child's custody to the exclusion of the grandparents who
then had it.
Of course, the other side of the shield must be considered. Not only does the adoptive parent acquire a right
equivalent to that of a natural parent, upon adoption, to
custody, but such adoptive parent can be deprived of custody for exactly the same reasons as a natural parent, viz.,
that the continued custody is not for the best interests of
the child. This was recognized, though rejected on the
merits, in Spencer v. Franks.2 So, too, the concluding
statement in Backus v. Reynolds,93 where a bill to annul
and rescind an adoption was dismissed, recognized the
power of equity to readjust custody against the adopting
parents if their custody proved positively improper.
n
4 the Court of Appeals
In Alston v. Thomas
reversed
a peculiar ruling of the Chancellor, who had confused the
problems of custody and adoption. The foster-parents had
sought adoption, and the natural father, the sole surviving
parent, resisted it. The Chancellor declined to decree
adoption, but did award the "permanent custody" of the
child to petitioners. This the Court of Appeals reversed,
as it decided that an adoption outright should have been
decreed. It was pointed out that our law does not recognize such a thing as "permanent custody", as any award
of custody, as such, is temporary in the sense that it is
subject to modification for supervening changes in conditions affecting the child's welfare. Outright adoption, on
the other hand, is relatively more permanent, in that it
creates a presumption in favor of continued custody in the
recipients, equally as hard to overcome as the presumption
in favor of natural parents.
So, too, in Connelly v. Jones, 5 the distinction between
an award of custody and the decreeing of an adoption was
emphasized. There, the Court of Appeals reversed the
92 173
93 159
01 161
"165

Md.
Md.
Md.
Md.

73, 195 A. 306, 114 A. L. R. 263 (1937).
601, 152 A. 109 (1930).
617, 158 A. 24 (1931).
544, 170 A. 174 (1933).

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VII

Chancellor's decreeing an adoption to a great-aunt over
the opposition of the natural father, sole surviving parent.
The circumstances there were more favorable to the father
than in Alston v. Thomas. The Court said that, had the
question been one. of custody instead of adoption, they
would have awarded it to the great-aunt. In fact, it was
obvious that the father was not going to dispute the custody
in her for the time being, but what he was opposing was
his being forced to relinquish all future claim to custody,
did his situation improve. This would have followed had
the adoption decree been affirmed. These cases, too, bear
out the point that the successful petitioner in adoption
obtains exactly the same right, no more, no less, to the
custody of the child as would normally be possessed by
the natural parents of a child who had not been adopted
by others.
There has been no decision at all in Maryland about
the parallel problems of the rights to the earnings and
services of the adopted child during his minority but it
would be a safe generalization, by analogy to the rule for
custody, and following general authority9 6 on the point,
that the adopting parent alone is entitled to the earnings
and services of the child, including the right to sue for
loss of services resulting from injury to or seduction of
a minor.
Support and Maintenance
An important consequence of adoption is the effect
it may have on the question of the duty to support, between
adoptee and adopter, and, for that matter, between adoptee
and natural parent. The statute clarifies certain of the
problems that may arise when it provides that the adopted
child shall receive "the same rights of protection, education, and maintenance as if born to such petitioner in
lawful wedlock. ' 97 Similarly, the natural parents are relieved of such duties by the provision that they "shall be
freed of all legal obligation towards" the child.98 This
96 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTIC RELATIONS
7 Section 81, infra, n. 111.
98 Ibid.

(1931)

360.

1943]

ADOPTION

makes it clear that adoption of an infant imposes on the
adoptive parent the full legal duty of support, no doubt
enforceable by any one of the three existing legal devices
for compelling this from natural parents, viz., criminal
prosecution,9 9 equity order, 10 or suit in assumpsit to recover for money and goods advanced. 10 1 By the same
token, the natural parent is absolved from this duty. There
is no problem, of course, of support of the adoptee when
an adult is adopted.
The Selective Service regulations,0 2 currently of interest, recognize that an adopted child is the equivalent of
a natural child for purposes of draft deferment for dependency. The Maryland Workmen's Compensation Law
likewise recognizes an adopted child as a child for compensation purposes by its provision' that "child" or "children"
shall include adopted children, whether members of the
deceased's household or not. This was commented on in
Scott v. Independent Ice Co.,0 4 where the Court held that,
as the law then stood (it has subsequently been changed),
an illegitimate child was not entitled to compensation even
though living in the household of the deceased. The Court
remarked on the fact that the statute already contained a
provision in favor of adopted children and, from specific
mention of them, concluded the Legislature had not intended to include illegitimates, else it would have mentioned them also. The Court also cited the provision of
the adoption law which entitles adopted children to receive
support from the adopting parents as supporting their conclusion in the case.
The previous discussion has been concerned with the
duty of the adopting parent to support the child. The
converse problem is, to what extent does the adopted child
acquire a duty to support the parent, comparable to that
99 Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sees. 89 to 96.
100 Md. Code
(1939) Art. 16, Sees. 41, 85.
10. See Kriedo v. Kriedo, 159 Md. 229, 150 A. 720 (1930) ; Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 A. 132 (1907) ; and Boggs v. Boggs, 138 Md. 422, 114
A. 474 (1921), for leading Maryland cases on this.
102 Selective Service Regulations, Sees. 622.32, 622.33.
Md. Code (1939) Art. 101, See. 80 (10), as amended, Md. Laws 1941,
Chs. 627, 773.
104 135 Md. 343, 109 A, 118
(1919).
20'
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of a natural child? Or, to what extent is the adoptee relieved of his otherwise existent duty to support his natural
parents?
Coming up by way of a Workmen's Compensation problem, one Maryland case has had to deal with the question
of support of adoptive parent by adopted child. This was
Victory Sparkler Co. v. Gilbert,10 5 which recognized an
adoption under the law of Delaware, and held that an
adopting mother was a "mother" under the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act and so was entitled to
compensation. While there has been no decision in Maryland on the point, yet it would seem that, by analogy to
the Victory Sparkler holding, adoptive relationship should
entitle to recovery under the Maryland Lord Campbell's
Act' for wrongful death, as readily as would natural
parent and child relationship. Thus an adopted child, or
an adoptive parent, should as readily be entitled to damages for the death of the other as would one in a natural
relationship. Here again, the question is suggested whether
a distinction will be drawn between adoption of an infant
and adoption of one already an adult.
This suggests the question whether an adopted child
is compellable to support the adoptive parent under the
other local rules which are applicable to natural children.
It so happens that the only local legal device for directly
compelling natural children to support their parents is the
criminal statute 10 7 which punishes adult children who do
not provide support for their destitute and indigent parents. Unlike the converse situation of support of children
by parents, there is no other legal device, such as an equity
order, or suit in assumpsit for necessaries furnished, in
the case of a parent who is in need of support from
children.
There has been no decision by the Court of Appeals
on the point whether the destitute parent statute goes to
adopted children as well as natural ones. It would seem
as plausible to argue that "child" or "parent" in the desti105 160 Md. 181, 153 A. 275 (1931).
100

10

Md. Code (1939) Art. 67.
Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sees. 98-104.
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tute parent law means adopted child or parent as it was
for the Court of Appeals in the Victory Sparkler case to
find that "mother" in the Workmen's Compensation Law
included adopting mother. But, perhaps, a distinction
could be made on the ground that the Court favors a liberal
interpretation of the Compensation Law, 08 while the destitute parent one, being a criminal statute, must be strictly
construed. The latter conclusion would be bolstered by
the fact that the adoption law itself makes specific provision'019 for when "child" shall mean adopted child, and
that, therefore, the Legislature intended that it should not
include adoptive relationships in other than the enumerated cases.
Another problem suggests itself, and it has been treated
neither in the statute nor by case adjudication. Is an
adopted child, under the destitute parent statute, compellable to support his natural parents? By using the logic
of Spencer v. Franks"' (that explicit provision for duty
of support in the adopting parent implicitly gave him the
sole claim to custody) we might say that the specific release of the natural parents from their duty to support
the child automatically carries with it their surrender of
their expectation of receiving support from the child if
they become destitute.
But a further distinction suggests itself. Would it be
significant whether the adoptee were an infant or an adult
at the time of the adoption? It is plausible to argue that
one adopted while an infant should be compellable to support only the adoptive parents who supported him in
infancy, and yet it ought to be impossible for an adult
person, by arranging for an adoption and consenting
thereto, to escape his duty of supporting his natural parents who, supposedly, did support him during infancy.
After all, the problem is a rather narrow one, for it only
arises within the field of the criminal statute for nonsupport of indigent parents, which itself is rarely called
on to be applied even to natural children.

"'8Victory

Sparkler Co. v. Gilbert, 8upra, n. 105.

109 Section 83, infra, n. 122.
110 173 Md. 73, 195 A. 306, 114

A. L. R. 263 (1937).
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Inheritance
Not the least important questions arising in the adoption
field are those concerned with inheritance by and from
adopted children. Primarily the problem is that of inheritance in the case of intestacy, but an incidental question
of inclusion of adopted children in classes specified in wills
also may arise. An adopted child may, of course, be disinherited by the adopting parent as freely as may natural
children be disinherited.
The principal provision"' of the adoption statute on the
point is to the effect that adoption entitles the adoptee to
the same rights of inheritance and distribution in the petitioner's estate as if born to petitioner in lawful wedlock.
There are also special provisions for inheritance from the
adopted child, 1 2 for the meaning of the word "child" with
reference to adopted children when used in written instruments," 3 and for inheritance of Maryland property by those
adopted under the laws of other states,"' all of which will
be discussed more intensively at proper places herein.
Many Maryland cases touching on the question of inheritance by adopted children have merely involved the
problem whether the adoption statute of 1892 was sufficiently complied with, and these have been discussed elsewhere from that angle. Thus, Hiss v. McCabe"5 and
Fisher v. Wagner" 6 merely pointed out that the "adopted"
"'Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 81: The effect of such decree of
adoption shall be to entitle the child so adopted to the same rights of
inheritance and distribution as to the petitioner's estate, and the same
rights of protection, education and maintenance as if born to such petitioner in lawful wedlock, and the natural parents of such child shall be
freed from all legal obligation towards it, provided that where such
child inherits property from its adopted parent or parents, upon it dying
intestate without issue the property thus inherited shall descend and be
distributed to the same persons who would take the same by inheritance
and in course of distribution if the child had been the child of the
adopted parents born to them in lawful wedlock; provided, however, that
this shall not be construed to limit or interfere with the power of disposition over such property by gift, grant, devise, bequest or otherwise
by said adopted child.
112 Ibid.
Section 83, infra, n. 122.
114 Section 84, supra, n. 49.
11545 Md. 77 (1876), supra, n. 14.
116 109 Md. 243, 71 A. 999, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 121 (1909), supra, 11. 15.
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children took nothing inasmuch as either the adoption
was well before 1892, or the death in question took place
before then. The same result was indicated in Holritter
v. Wagner"7 with reference to the claim of an "adopted"
daughter to appointment as administrator. Then, too,
Supreme Council v. Green,"58 and Clayton v. Heptasophs"I9
which also involved non-compliance with. the statute, dealt
with fraternal insurance benefits rather than inheritance
of property in the strict sense.
Until the Winter of 1942-43, there had been only two
cases really involving inheritance by and from legally
adopted children, and, in fact, one of these went off on noncompliance with the 1892 law, although the Court therein,
by dictum, did point out that the same result would have
been reached had it been complied with. This was Zimmerman v. Thomas,120 where the adopting parent's brother
had left property to the "children" of that parent. The
Court held that the adopted child did not take under the
bequest, pointing out that even under the 1892 law, if complied with, "child" in a legal document means adopted child
only when used in documents executed by the adopting
parent. From this it follows that an adopted child does
not inherit from any others in the adopting family than
the parent or parents, and will not share in a class described as "children" in the wills of others than the adopting parent.
This same result was arrived at in Eureka Life Insurance Co. v. Geis and Hollstein"1' where the adopting parent's own mother, in her will, upon a condition which had
happened, devised certain ground rents to her own "right
heirs." The Court held that the adopted grand-child did
not take, emphasizing the specific provision in the statute'2 2
117 139 Md. 603, 116 A. 569 (1921),

supra, n. 16.
-" 71 Md. 263, 17 A. 1048, 17 A. S. R. 527 (1889), supra, n. 19.
110 130 Md. 31, 99 A. 949 (1917), smpra, n. 20.
"10 152 Md. 263, 136 A. 636 (1927).
121 121 Md. 196, 88 A. 158 (1913).

P1 Md. Code (1939) Art. 16, Sec. 83: The term "child" or its equivalent
in a deed, grant, will or other written instrument shall be held to include
any child adopted by the person executing the same, unless the contrary
plainly appears by the term -thereof, whether such instrument be executed
before or after the adoption.
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to the effect that "child" means only an adopted child of
the person executing the document, and the further provision that the adopted child becomes the heir of the adopting parent.
In MacNabb v. Sheridan,'2 3 decided by the Court of
Appeals at the October Term, 1942, a similar problem was
potentially presented, although, as it turned out, the Court
of Appeals did not have to decide the point of adoption
law. In that case the decedent died intestate, owning real
estate and leaving several heirs. The real estate had been
sold by a trustee appointed by the court for that purpose.
The appellee was an adopted daughter of a brother of the
decedent's, which brother had pre-deceased the decedent.
The auditor's report of the proceeds of the partition sale
had excluded this adoptive niece, and she filed exceptions,
which were sustained by the trial court, the court holding
that she was entitled to share as a niece. The trustee,
after obtaining the court's permission to do so, appealed
from this ruling, but none of the other heirs joined in the
appeal.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without
deciding whether the trial court was right or wrong in
allowing the adoptive niece to share. The dismissal was
on the ground that the statute1 24 allowing trustees to appeal
did not cover this situation, so that one of the other heirs
should have taken the appeal. The appellant's brief had
cited both Zimmerman v. Thomas and Eureka Life Insurance Co. v. Geis as dictating a reversal on the merits, and
it is hard to see how the Court could have avoided reversing if the case had been properly before it, in view of these
cases.
A further question arises, does an adopted child nevertheless inherit from his natural parents and other relatives
in the event of their deaths intestate? For lack of specific
provision in the statute otherwise, and following general
authority, 2 ' the answer is that he does inherit from his
128 29 A. (2d) 271 (Md., 1942).
12'Md. Code (1939) Art. 5, Sec. 43.
125

MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS

(1931) 363, n. 41.
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natural relatives despite being adopted. The question has
not yet been decided in Maryland but the answer would
seem obvious.
A still further problem is this: Who inherits from an
adopted child in the event of his death intestate? The
statute has specific provision with reference to property
earlier inherited from the adopting parents, to the effect
that if the child shall die intestate and without issue, such
property shall descend and be distributed to the same
persons as if the adopted child had been born in lawful
wedlock to the adopting parents. 126 This means that such
property stays on the adopting side, instead of going to
the natural relatives. 2 7 It is specifically provided however, that an adopted child may dispose of such property
by gift, grant, devise, bequest, or otherwise.
Other property of the intestate adoptee, however, would
descend and be distributed to his natural relatives, rather
than to the adopting parents or other adoptive relatives.
This would seem to follow from the statute's failure to
provide otherwise, and from its specific treatment of the
included question of property originally inherited from
the adopting parents. However, it would seem potentially
unjust that the natural parents or other relatives, rather
than the adopting parents, should receive property acquired by the adoptee, merely because he failed to make
or was incapable of making a will, when the adopting parents were the only ones who probably expended their own
money and effort in his rearing. But the conclusion remains, following general authority, 28 that the specific provisions of the adoption statute for abnormal inheritance
were meant to be exclusive, and the result is that, while
the adopted child inherits from the adopting parents, they
do not inherit from him, and that natural relatives will
take to the exclusion of adopting parents and other rela126 Section 81, 8upra, n. 111.
127 For an interesting case involving a somewhat different solution of

the same problem by the Illinois statute, see Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 131
F. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
128 MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 866.
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tions, save in the narrow case of property acquired by
inheritance from the adopting parents.
It would well seem that the statute should be amended
or supplemented in order to avoid this potential injustice,
by making specific provision for inheritance from an
adopted child. It is suggested that adopting parents might
well be made the first class to inherit if there be no children
of the adoptee, and that natural relatives should not inherit at all save where there are no surviving children nor
adopting parents and then only if the nearest natural kin
be closer in degree than the nearest adoptive kin.
Lacking such statutory reform of this obvious injustice
under the existing adoption law, it is possible, by careful
draftsmanship of instruments conferring property on
adoptees, to determine that the adopting parents shall take
to the exclusion of the natural relatives in the event of
the adoptee's intestate death. This can particularly be
done in settling property on an infant adoptee, in order
to guard against the possibility of death prior to attaining
the age of capacity to make a will. The obvious course
is to leave the property in trust for the infant adoptee until
attaining sufficient age to make a valid will, with provision
for remainder to the adopting parents in the case of the
infant's death before attaining that age.
Considerable thought should be given to this problem
when the adopted infant is the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, for which a trust or "optional mode of settlement" can be established in line with the previous suggestion.
With reference to property inherited from one of the
adopting parents, the specific provision in the existing
statute would avoid the injustice, for it would go back
to the other adoptive parent or to some relative on that
side, but life insurance benefits would end up in the hands
of the natural relatives if the beneficiary later died intestate, unless some such provision as is outlined above were
made.
Thus, unless a trust or some other device is used, property directly bequeathed to an adopted grand-child
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(adopted child of one's own child) would end up in the
hands of the natural relatives upon death intestate unless
that result were guarded against. The doctrine of worthier
title might possibly avoid that as to property coming by
bequest or devise from the adopting parents themselves,
rather than by inheritance, 129 but it may be, under the
ramifications of that exotic doctrine, that even as to property bequeathed or devised by the adopting parents, it
would go to the natural relatives in the event of the
adoptee's death intestate,13° as the law now stands, as it
would in the case of property given inter vivos. That
possibility, more than anything else, suggests the need for
statutory reform of the problem of inheritance from an
adoptee.
The question of inheritance of Maryland property by
those adopted in other states has already been dealt with
elsewhere,' 3 in connection with Conflict of Laws problems
in general. Under the specific Maryland statutory treat3 2 of the problem,
ment"
one adopted elsewhere would not
inherit unless the law of the state of adoption would entitle him to, and then only if such law is not inconsistent
with the specific provisions of the Maryland law. 133 As
was pointed out above, this statute is most confusing and
awkwardly drawn, and there is little profit in speculating
about the various possible results under it, lacking any
adjudication under it in the Maryland cases. Here, too,
there is need for statutory reform to the end that those
120Thus, if property came to the adoptee under the adopter's will, the
doctrine of worthier title (if applicable) would make this be regarded as
having come by descent and thus clearly it would stay on the adopter's
side of the family if the adoptee died intestate. There is a question, of
course, whether the effect of Section 81, supra, n. 111, is to apply to keep
the property in the adopting family regardless whether the property comes
from adopter to adoptee by descent or under a will. The statutory phrase
"such child inherits property from" might be limited to taking by intestacy
or more broadly apply to taking by will.
180 See Reno, The Doctrine of Worthier Title as Applied in Maryland
(1939) 4 Md. L. Rev. 50, 54-55, to the effect that the Maryland version of
the doctrine would apply only where there is a single heir who is also
devisee. Thus, only if the adopted child be the only child, would the doctrine of worthier title aid the situation.
181Supra, circa n. 49, et seq.
182 Section 84, supra, n. 49.
183 For an example of the kind of conflict that arises when there are differences in the rules of the state of adoption and the state where the
land lies, see Anderson v. French, 77 N. H. 509, 93 A. 1042 (1915).
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validly adopted elsewhere shall inherit Maryland property
exactly as if they had been adopted by a Maryland proceeding.
Revocation of Will
One of the minor sequelae of adopting a child is the
effect it may have by way of working a total or partial
revocation of a previously executed will of the adopting
party. Under a statute' passed in 1937 for the primary
purpose of clarifying the problem of the effect on a will
of marriage and/or birth of issue, it is provided that adoption, and also legitimation of a previously illegitimate child,
shall have exactly the same effect as birth of legitimate
issue.
Under this statute it is clear that if the sequence of
events be will, marriage, adoption, then the will executed
before the marriage is totally revoked. While it is not
quite so clear, yet it is arguable that the will is also totally
revoked when the sequence be will, adoption, marriage;
or when it be adoption, will, marriage. These latter results
would also seem to follow under the statutory provision
that "a will shall be revoked by the subsequent marriage
of the testator coupled with birth, adoption or legitimation
of a child by him." The phrase "coupled with" could
indicate that the adoption might precede the marriage,
or, for that matter, the will, so long as the marriage is
after the will.
When there is no marriage, or the will is executed after
marriage, subsequent adoption of a child does not totally
revoke a will executed prior to the adoption, and the
second part of the statute then applies. Under it, if the
testator has either (A) made no provision at all for any
child, or (B) has provided for an existing child or children
and has also provided for children subsequently adopted
(or born or legitimated), then the subsequently adopted
children take either nothing in case (A) or what if anything is provided for them in case (B). If, however, such
"' Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 338.
For treatment of the Maryland
law about this prior to the 1937 statute, see Lentz, Revocation of a Will by
Birth of a Child (1936) 1 Md. L. Rev. 32.
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a testator provides for an existing child or children without providing for subsequently adopted ones, then such
subsequently adopted ones, if they survive the testator,
each take an intestate share, although the will otherwise
stands.
In this final respect, as in the others, we see how the
tendency is to assimilate legitimate birth, subsequent legitimation, and adoption, with respect to the legal consequences which respectively follow.

